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Introduction
On October 16, 2011, Kenya launched Operation Linda Nchi1 and dis-
patched some two thousand troops into Somalia.2  Kenya later told the
United Nations Security Council that it was defending itself against
increased incursions and terrorist activity by the militant group Al
Shabaab.3  These attacks were not a recent phenomenon, however, and for
several years prior to the invasion, Al Shabaab militants ran cross-border
raids and piracy operations along the northeastern border region of Kenya
and Somalia.4  In fact, Kenya has struggled with cross-border criminal
activity since the collapse of the State of Somalia over two decades ago, but
† LL.B., University of Warwick (Coventry, United Kingdom), 2010; J.D., Cornell
Law School, 2016; Senior Notes Editor, Cornell International Law Journal, 2015-16.
Many thanks to the members of the Cornell International Law Journal for their invaluable
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1. “Linda Nchi” is a Swahili phrase meaning “protect the  country.”
2. Daniel Branch, Why Kenya Invaded Somalia, FOREIGN AFF. (Nov. 15, 2011), http:/
/www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136670/daniel-branch/why-kenya-invaded-somalia.
3. Daley J. Birkett, The Legality of the 2011 Kenyan Invasion of Somalia and its Impli-
cations for the Jus Ad Bellum, 18 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L.  427, 427 (2013).
4. Branch, supra note 2. R
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had never taken such robust international action.5
Despite the uncertainty over what motivated Kenya’s military interven-
tion into Somalia in the first place— be it a legitimate concern for national
security or internal politics— many scholars argue that the invasion was
legal under international law.6  The self-defense rationale has been unoffi-
cially accepted as offering legal coverage for Kenya’s actions, and likely
explains why the International Criminal Court (ICC) has not reprimanded
Kenya for its actions.7
While there may be some questions about the proportionality of
Kenya’s response, few disagree that a victim state has a right to self-defense
stemming from attacks committed by non-state actors such as Al Shabaab.8
What is less known about this international incident is that the Somali
government consented to Kenya’s military intervention for the purposes of
neutralizing Al Shabaab.9  Assuming arguendo that the self-defense ratio-
nale was not justifiable in this instance— a position that this Note does not
take— what impact could the Somali government’s consent to the interven-
tion have had on the legality of the Kenyan government’s actions?  Can a
government that is barely in control of its country offer valid consent to
international intervention?  Additionally, how should the voice of that
nation be treated in an international forum and what impact should that
government’s decision have?  These questions are not limited to the Kenya-
Somalia context.  In fact, they apply to a variety of international disputes,
even those stemming from internal conflicts within one nation.
On center stage today is an ongoing crisis in Syria and other middle-
eastern countries.  The respective control that Iraq and Syria have over
their territories has become increasingly questionable with the growing
dominance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).10  This reduction in
control is important because it could put the legality of United States drone
strikes in the region into question.  Consent of the Iraqi government casts
away most doubt regarding the legitimacy of U.S. interventionist actions.11
Commentators on the Syrian crisis point out this difference as a primary
5. Birkett, supra note 3. R
6. See, e.g., id. at 444– 45. But see Mark Kersten, Opinion, Chasing al-Shabaab: Is
Kenya ‘Right to Intervene’ in Somalia?, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Oct. 31, 2011), http://jus-
ticeinconflict.org/2011/10/31/chasing-al-shabaab-is-kenya-right-to-intervene-in-
somalia/ (contending that Kenya’s invasion of Somalia may have contravened interna-
tional law because it was disproportionate to Al Shabaab’s criminal activity in Kenya).
7. See S.C. Res. 2036, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2036 (Feb. 22, 2012) (incorporating
Kenyan troops into the African Union Mission in Somalia). See generally Birkett, supra
note 3.
8. Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy, 54
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 17 (2013).
9. Can Kenya’s invasion of Somalia be justified?, MERCATORNET (Oct. 26, 2011),
http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/can_kenyas_invasion_of_somalia_be_justi
fied.
10. See Helene Cooper et al., U.S. Launches New Airstrikes on ISIS to Protect Dam in
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/08/world/mid-
dleeast/iraq.html.
11. See Ranj Alaaldin & Bilal Khan, Airstrikes on Isis targets in Syria and Iraq are
legal under international law, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI. BLOG (Oct. 1, 2014), http:/
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reason to question the legality of the drone strikes targeting ISIS within
Syria.12  Without consent, the legality of the strikes would largely depend
on the availability of the “responsibility to protect” doctrine developed by
the United Nations in the context of genocide,13 which the U.N. later
expanded to apply to protection against war crimes, crimes against human-
ity, and ethnic cleansing.14  Without delving too deep into whether this
rationale would support U.S. drone strikes, it is worth noting that the
responsibility to protect doctrine was envisioned to sanction intervention
only as a last resort, and as part of a collective-action response to the afore-
mentioned crises.15  It is not clear whether this particular line of U.S.
action is part of a collective-action effort, and it certainly would not be
supported by a self-defense rationale given that Syria did not attack the
United States.  Therefore, a good amount of its legitimacy arguably comes
from consent.  This Note does not seek to resolve the specific dilemma of
the legality of the usage of drone strikes, but rather seeks to answer the
broader questions raised above surrounding consent and the use of force
in an abstract context.
In answering these questions, this Note will challenge the sufficiency
of the current international provisions and legal rules governing use of
force in the international context.  Self-defense (which encompasses collec-
tive self-defense and has a textual underpinning in Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter),16 consent, and the responsibility to protect are the prominent
legal doctrines in this area.17  This Note argues that Article 51, as written,
is insufficient to offer a legal basis for the kind of intervention that is
becoming necessary to promote peace in certain parts of the world.  The
responsibility to protect doctrine, as written, likely does not apply to a vari-
ety of contemporary crises, and would largely be unavailable as a source of
legitimacy for certain interventionist actions.  Furthermore, this Note will
/blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/10/01/airstrikes-on-isis-targets-in-syria-and-iraq-are-
legal-under-international-law/.
12. Id.
13. Responsibility to Protect, U.N. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR ON THE PREVENTION
OF GENOCIDE, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml (last
visited Feb. 11, 2016).
14. The responsibility to protect doctrine has three pillars:
1. A state has a responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement;
2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist the
state to fulfill its primary responsibility;
3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplo-
matic, humanitarian, and other means to protect populations from these crimes.
If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international com-
munity must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in
accordance with the U.N. Charter.  Military intervention is considered the last
resort.
See Background Information on the Responsibility to Protect, OUTREACH PROGRAMME ON THE
RWANDA GENOCIDE AND THE U.N., http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/
about/bgresponsibility.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
15. See id.
16. U.N. Charter art. 51.
17. Deeks, supra note 8, at 15. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-1\CIN107.txt unknown Seq: 4 11-MAY-16 15:59
204 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 49
take the position that the doctrine of consent needs a more structured
approach.  Its applicability has enormous breadth, yet the doctrine has no
textual underpinning, and operates in a malleable manner with several
undefined contours.  This malleability results in inconsistent and illogical
application of the doctrine, which creates international law quagmires in
this new age of intervention.
Part I of this Note will provide background into this area of law, map-
ping out the relevant doctrines and highlighting their general modes of
operation.  Part II will describe contemporary case examples, including the
Kenyan military intervention into Somalia, and U.S. intervention in Syria
and Iraq with respect to the actions by ISIS.  These case examples raise
difficult use of force questions— especially with regard to consent— that are
often glossed over for political or pragmatic reasons.  Part III will explore
how the unstructured consent doctrine operates in these case examples
and variations thereof.  Although consent may have played only a small
role in some of the specific incidents themselves, this Note will fully
explore the doctrine’s contours by examining hypotheticals in which con-
sent was the central factor.  Part IV will propose a more structured consent
doctrine, premised on two principals from private U.S. law that could be
useful in creating a nuanced approach to this area of international law.
Rather than offering a definitive solution, this Note’s ultimate goal is to
insist that the question surrounding the efficacy of consent be asked rather
than presumed.
I. Background on the Use of Force and Intervention
Many academics in international law assert “that there are three inter-
national legal bases for the use of force: self-defense, authorization by the
U.N. Security Council pursuant to a Chapter VII resolution, and con-
sent.”18  The first two bases for the use of force have a textual underpin-
ning in the U.N. Charter.19  The Charter was signed on June 26, 1945, and
came into force on October 24, 1945, binding the fifty countries repre-
sented therein to all of the articles contained in the Charter after World
War II.20  Subsequently, several more countries signed the Charter to
become member states of the United Nations; today 193 countries are
represented.21
Article 51 of the Charter provides the governing international legal
provision on self-defense and U.N. Security Council-sanctioned use of
18. Id.
19. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
20. Introductory Note, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/
introductory-note/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016); History of the United Nations,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/index
.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
21. See Charter of the United Nations, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un
.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=I-1&chapter=1&lang=en (last visited
Apr. 9, 2016) for a list of current U.N. Charter signatories.
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force (sometimes referred to as collective self-defense).22  This provision
states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defen[s]e if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.  Measures taken by Members in
the exercise of this right of self-defen[s]e shall be immediately reported to
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.23
The Member States have not amended Article 51 of the Charter since its
promulgation in 1945, and it therefore remains— as originally written— the
controlling law with regard to self-defense in the international arena.  This
provision was traditionally interpreted to govern situations that involved
self-defense with regard to “armed attacks” by other states, rather than pri-
vate actors, despite the fact that nothing in the language specifically limited
“armed attacks” to “state armed attacks.”24  This original interpretation
was quickly questioned in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the growth of
terrorism in the new era.25  It subsequently became generally accepted that
the inherent right of self-defense extended to private attacks by parties
operating overtly out of a particular state, even though there was no gov-
ernment involvement per se.26
Recently, scholars have reinterpreted Article 51 of the Charter to deter-
mine how it should apply to the rogue acts of private factions not sanc-
tioned by any state or government.27  It is not entirely clear, however, how
or whether this provision can be applied absent Security Council participa-
tion.  This obscurity is distinctly robust in situations where the govern-
ment of a particular state in an internal crisis seeks outside assistance in
the form of intervention to create stability.
Consent also plays a huge role in the use of force spectrum— as it does
generally in international law.28  In fact, some scholars argue that even
when the Security Council sanctions a military intervention in one of the
Member States, consent is technically the controlling factor because the
consent of that state has already been acquired through that state’s prior
accession to the Charter.29  It is clear that consent has a much broader
scope than Article 51 of the Charter.  “By virtue of consent’s power, a state
must comply with its treaty obligations even where the provisions of that
22. U.N. Charter art. 51.
23. Id.
24. Tom Ruys, Attacks by Private Actors and the Right of Self Defence, 10 J. CONFLICT
& SECURITY L. 289, 291 (2005).
25. See id. at 299.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Deeks, supra note 8, at 8– 11. R
29. Id. at 9.
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treaty contradict its domestic laws.”30  This compliance attaches to simple
bilateral agreements as well; a state cannot assert that its consent was ultra
vires in order to escape its obligations.31  Therefore, if a state received con-
sent to intervene and used force in another state, technically, the interven-
ing state could invoke consent as a defense to any violation of international
law claims.32
Scholars currently disagree over the role of consent in contemporary
use-of-force contexts, including force against non-state terrorist groups and
consent to intervention in an attempt to combat intervention by another
state.  An example of the latter situation would be whether and how
Ukraine could consent to use of force by a third party in order to assist
with the ejection of Russia within its borders.33  Some scholars suggest that
consent can stand alone as an independent basis for the use of force in
another state.34  Other scholars suggest that consent has a role to play in
the calculus, but in and of itself, cannot serve as an independent basis for
the use of force in another state.35  Yet other scholars think of consent as a
mechanism to address sovereignty concerns and argue that there must be
an existing affirmative right of intervention like self-defense, such that con-
sent simply plays a supplementary role in paying consideration to that
nation’s sovereignty.36  At the other extreme, some scholars take the posi-
tion that consent is not a valid basis for international use of force in partic-
ular circumstances.37
With such a wide array of varying perspectives, it is easy to see how
states struggle with the application of consent in the area of international
use of force.38  This Note will add another dimension to the calculus.
30. Id. at 10.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 17. See Shaun Walker, As Russia enters war in Syria, conflict in Ukraine
begins to wind down, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2015/oct/01/as-russia-enters-war-in-syria-conflict-in-ukraine-begins-to-wind-down.
34. See, e.g., John Cerone, Misplaced Reliance on the “Law of War”, 14 NEW ENG. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 57, 59– 61 (2007) (suggesting that the United States could have relied
on Afghan consent alone as an international legal basis for using force in Afghanistan
after September 11).
35. See, e.g., Monika Hlavkova, Meeting Summary, International Law and the Use of
Drones, Summary of the International Law Discussion Group meeting held at Chatham
House, SCRIBD (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.scribd.com/doc/45528058/Drones-and-
International-Law (“With regard to the use of drones, it is generally agreed that opera-
tions may be launched into the territory of another state with that state’s consent, albeit
with limits.  Examples of such circumstances include those in which the territorial state
(1) agrees to other state’s self-defen[s]e action, (2) asks the other state to assist with its
non-international armed conflict, as is the case in Afghanistan, (3) requests the other
state’s assistance in complying with its obligation to police its own territory, or (4) seeks
assistance with its own law enforcement operation against terrorists.”).
36. See, e.g., Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, 1
HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 145, 164 (2010).
37. See, e.g., John L. Hargrove, Intervention by Invitation and the Politics of the New
World Order, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 113, 116– 17 (Lori
Damrosch & David Scheffer eds., 1991) (asserting that consent cannot validate activities
that would have been unlawful by the consenting state if acting alone).
38. Deeks, supra note 8, at 16. R
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Rather than assume that consent is voluntary and valid in certain interna-
tional contexts, this Note posits that the thinking surrounding consent has
been two-dimensional.  There could be situations where international law
should not recognize consent because certain governments lack the legal
capacity to provide consent, or their consent cannot be deemed valid or
representative of the state’s wishes.  In those situations, a more principled
and structured doctrine needs to be developed to fill a gap which is present
in several contemporary international conflicts.
The “responsibility to protect” doctrine also rears its head in this
arena.  The doctrine emerged in the 1990s as the international commu-
nity’s response to the atrocities in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo.39  The
responsibility to protect doctrine was borne out of a need for effective inter-
vention in regions without the capability to protect their own citizens.40  Its
goal was to create the political will to intervene in such circumstances and
overcome the paralyzing impact of the veto power exercised by the perma-
nent members of the Security Council.41  At first glance, this doctrine
seems to be at odds with the principle of non-intervention that lies at the
heart of the principle of sovereignty.42  The United Nations, however, envi-
sioned that if a state fails to protect its people from genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, or ethnic cleansing, the principle of non-inter-
vention should yield to the responsibility to protect, and the international
community has a responsibility to respond through collective action.43  By
declaring a responsibility— rather than a right to protect— the U.N. altered
the landscape of intervention because the former act of balancing the bene-
fits of intercession against infringement of sovereignty was a calculus that
need not have been pursued endlessly in severe international incidents.44
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) articulated three main duties with respect to the responsibility to
protect doctrine:
1) Prevent both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict putting
populations at risk;
2) If these causes cannot be prevented, a responsibility to protect is trig-
gered; and
3) After successful intervention because of the responsibility to protect, a
responsibility to rebuild is triggered, which entails giving the necessary
39. Rwanda brought to the frontline the impact of international inaction, as the
world passively witnessed the genocidal killings of the Tutsi ethnic group.  The incidents
in Bosnia and Kosovo showcased the effect of inadequate intervening measures and uni-
lateral interventionist action, creating a need for a more principled and uniform
approach from the international community in the face of such crises.  Saira Mohamed,
Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 319, 321– 23 (2010).
40. Id. at 323.
41. Id.
42. Under traditional international law principles, the canon of non-intervention
states that a state shall not intervene in the affairs of another state except when exercis-
ing its right to self-defense. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 1 (2001) [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT].
43. Mohamed, supra note 39, at 323. R
44. Id. at 324.
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assistance to the victim states to reconstruct, reconcile, and recover.45
When this doctrine was conceived, any intervention pursuant to the
responsibility to protect doctrine was to be carried out through the U.N.46
The report did not specifically assert a right by any Member State of the
U.N. to use the protection of human rights in another country as reason for
the military intervention in that state’s affairs.47  This was a sensible limi-
tation because it enabled the doctrine to be consistent with the Charter48
and avoided the problem of delegating too much discretionary power to the
individual Member States to interpret what circumstances were sufficient
to justify intervention.  It also discouraged individual Member States from
manipulating the doctrine to intervene in another state’s affairs for their
own benefit.  Under this doctrine, the Security Council would oversee any
action undertaken, given that it already had the mandate to act effectively
and promptly in matters of international peace and security.49
The ICISS did not restrict the modus operandi of the responsibility to
protect doctrine to situations where the Security Council would approve
intervening action.50  Rather, the ICISS recognized that certain procedural
defects often hindered the Security Council— namely the veto power and
the stringent voting requirement, which often paralyze the Security Coun-
cil from being able to take action.51  Therefore, as a contingency, the ICISS
acknowledged certain potentially viable  “alternatives”:
(1) Regional organizations such as the African Union or the European
Union could take action, even if action from these organizations would
traditionally require express Security Council authorization;
(2) A role for the General Assembly to meet in an emergency special session
when the Security Council was deadlocked in order to act through the
Uniting for Peace procedures, even though the General Assembly lacked
the authority to act unilaterally.52
These contingencies, however, were not true alternatives.  Rather, the ICISS
intended them to act more like pressuring mechanisms to leverage the
Security Council into taking action, and therefore, still adhere to the pre-
vailing concept that all military intervention must be sanctioned by the
45. Id.
46. Id. at 325.
47. Id.
48. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1 (“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the
United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its
duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”).
49. Mohamed, supra note 39, at 325. R
50. Id.
51. Amber Fitzgerald, Security Council Reform: Creating a More Representative Body of
the Entire U.N. Membership, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 319, 333– 34 (2000); Mohamed, supra
note 39, at 325.  In several instances, where the interests of China, Russia, or the United
States are implicated, any of those nations can exercise their veto power to foreclose a
particular cause of action available to the Security Council.
52. Mohamed, supra note 39, at 325. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 42, R
at 53– 54.
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Security Council.53
In practice this doctrine has not operated within the United Nations as
it was first conceived by the ICISS.  In fact, when it was adopted at the
World Summit in 2005, the original responsibility to protect doctrine was
significantly watered down, so much so that many scholars argue that the
international community did not intend to adopt it as a binding legal
norm.54  The United States strongly opposed the original document, and
therefore the ratified document— rather than articulating a responsibility or
duty to protect— merely articulates an inclination or a willingness by the
international community to help alleviate humanitarian crises in states
that could not adequately protect their citizens.55  These humanitarian cri-
ses were limited to genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansings, and crimes
against humanity, rejecting the original document’s broader formulation of
“large-scale loss of life.”56  Furthermore, the document adopted by the
World Summit did not provide contingencies for a situation in which the
Security Council was deadlocked or could not act.57  Essentially, the inter-
national community adopted a “statement of preparedness,” not a “state-
ment of responsibility.”58
Therefore, as it stands, and after undergoing enormous debate over
whether the doctrine should be strengthened, the doctrine remains practi-
cally unaltered— a mere statement of preparedness.59  Like Article 51 of the
Charter, the centrality of the Security Council in the operation of this doc-
trine lends much more structure and certainty to its operation.  Neverthe-
less, adopting that structure leads to the difficulties associated with
attaining unanimous Security Council approval and the limited set of cri-
ses to which the doctrine applies.  Its scope, in the grand scheme of things,
is rather restricted.
As this overview has illustrated, the operation of consent in the inter-
national context is uninhibited by structure or any tangible, demanding
rules that could curtail its invocation or its use as a justification for inter-
vention.  This Note posits that, in the use of force arena, areas not covered
by the self-defense or the responsibility to protect doctrines are necessarily
governed by the consent doctrine, which raises a whole slew of questions
which are rarely addressed.
53. Mohamed, supra note 39, at 335. R
54. See Thomas G. Weiss, R2P After 9/11 and the World Summit, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J.
741, 750 (2006) (arguing that the World Summit approved R2P-lite). See also Carsten
Stahn, Notes and Comments, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal
Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 110 (2007) (concluding that the Outcome Document
leaves considerable doubt concerning whether and to what extent states intended to
create a legal norm).
55. Mohamed, supra note 39, at 327. R
56. Id.
57. Id. at 329.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 330.  Additionally, this Note expresses no opinion as to whether a mere
“statement of preparedness” is preferable to a “statement of responsibility.”  The consid-
erations required to evaluate the preferred approach for the responsibility to protect doc-
trine merit their own in-depth analysis.
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II. Case Examples: Controversies Seen Around the World
A. Kenya’s Intervention in Somalia
Operation Linda Nchi was the culmination of several years of tension
that plagued relations between Somalia and Kenya.60  Some argue that the
troubled relations stem back to the time of Kenya’s independence, when the
departing British colonialists and the Kenyan nationalist leaders “rode
roughshod over the demands of Kenya’s Somali population to be allowed to
join with Somalia at independence in 1963.”61  This created a strained rela-
tionship between the Kenyan government and Kenyan-Somalis at the time,
so much so that a low intensity war between the government and Somali
secessionists ensued between 1963 and 1967.62  The official reports state
that about two thousand insurgents were killed during that conflict; both
scholars and commentators, however, suspect that the actual number of
deaths was larger.63
At the conclusion of the conflict, the Kenyan government promised to
disburse funds for the purpose of developing northern Kenya and aiding
with re-settling the population largely affected by the clash.64  The govern-
ment, however, failed to do so, and also failed to provide a legitimate pres-
ence in the region, thus leaving the region unstable and prone to
skirmishes from across the border.65
During the 1980s, Somalia spun into crisis, and cross-border attacks
in northern Kenya became increasingly common.66  The crisis in Somalia
largely stemmed from the pursuits of the Barre regime.67  In the late 1970s,
the Barre regime of Somalia embarked on a military interventionist mis-
sion into Ethiopia in order to conquer the ethnic regions of that state.68
This proved to be a fatal error because the new Marxist regime in Ethiopia
received support from the Soviet Union and Cuba.69  Meanwhile, the Barre
regime lost its Soviet support, leaving the Somali National Army
underfunded and poorly provided for.70  While the government was
engrossed in this foreign conflict, military officers from the Majeerteen
60. See Birkett, supra note 3. R
61. See Daniel Branch, Kenya and Somalia: Landscape of Tension, OPEN DEMOCRACY
(Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.opendemocracy.net/daniel-branch/kenya-and-somalia-
landscape-of-tension.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. The “Barre regime” refers to the period in Somalia’s history where Mohammed
Siad Barre was the leader of the region.  He came into power through a coup in October
1961, when he overthrew the democratic leadership to rule Somalia as a dictator. See
George James, Somalia’s Overthrown Dictator, Mohammed Siad Barre, Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 3, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/03/obituaries/somalia-s-overthrown-
dictator-mohammed-siad-barre-is-dead.html.
68. Somalia: Atrocities under the Siad Barre Regime, CTR. FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY,
http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=287 (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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clan attempted a coup d’e´tat within Somalia in 1978.71  The rebellion
spread in the following years, and a group known as the “Somali National
Movement” was formed with the goal of overthrowing the Barre regime.72
The violence in Somalia increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s.73
Even after a peace agreement was reached with Ethiopia in 1988, several
rebel factions sought to overthrow the Barre regime and gain control of the
country.74  When Barre was eventually driven out of Mogadishu and into
exile, the rival militia leaders began to battle one another for control over
the newly declared “Republic of Somaliland.”75  This “conflagration spread
across Somalia, sparking a dire food crisis and eventually an ill-fated inter-
national humanitarian intervention.”76  Over twenty years later, Mogad-
ishu still lacks an effective government and largely remains a lawless
zone.77
In 2004, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia was
formed.78  The TFG represented the fourteenth attempt to create a func-
tioning government in the region since the end of Barre’s dictatorial rule in
1991.79  After its formation— and until 2005— the TFG performed whatever
governmental duties it had from Kenya.80  The TFG convened Parliament
on Somali soil for the first time in February 2006, and in 2007 the Presi-
dent of Somalia set foot in Mogadishu for the first time since his election in
2004.81  The TFG represented widespread hope for the international com-
munity, including neighbor Kenya, that peace would be restored in Somalia
and the “failed state” status would finally be shaken off.82  By mid-2008,
most experts lamented that the TFG was not the salvation the international
community had hoped for.83  Experts explained that the TFG was fraught
with systemic internal disagreement, and without a clear sense of direction,
the fundamentalist Islamic militias that governed different parts of Somalia
could not be quelled or subdued.84
During the period in which the TFG was largely ineffective, Kenya
experienced increased criminal activity within its borders, some of which
involved the kidnappings of several westerners.85  The Kenyan community
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Stephanie Hanson & Eben Kaplan, Somalia’s Transitional Government, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL. (May 12, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalias-transitional-gov-
ernment/p12475.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Kenya Forces Enter Somalia to Battle Militants, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/world/africa/kenyan-forces-
enter-somalia-to-battle-shabab.html.
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largely believed that this was the work of Somali bandits and pirates, who
were potentially connected to the Al Shabaab militant group.86  Addition-
ally, cross-border skirmishes in northern Kenya increased in frequency,
and the Kenyan government became increasingly concerned about its terri-
torial integrity.87  Operation Linda Nchi was subsequently launched.  Tem-
porally, it was a response to the recent events surrounding the kidnappings
across the Kenyan coast, but arguably it was a culminated response to years
of tension in the region.88
A day after the launch of Linda Nchi, Kenya wrote an informative letter
to the Security Council explaining Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia
and why it was justified.89  In the letter, Kenya claimed that its use of force
was necessary in view of the heightened security risk caused by increased
illegal activities on the Kenya-Somalia border.90  The letter elaborated that
this had been an ongoing crisis spanning from the collapse of Somalia over
the past two decades.91  The border conflicts had increased in intensity
during the thirty-six months prior to the attack, and the diversification into
kidnapping of foreign nationals in the coastal regions was the last straw.92
Prior to the launch of Linda Nchi, Kenya’s security measures were not suffi-
cient to deter Al Shabaab insurgents from continually attacking the border
communities, thus Kenya, invoking the right of self-defense, embarked on a
mission to disband the Al Shabaab network and neutralize the threats they
faced.93
There is really no consensus on the legality of this self-defense invoca-
tion.  Some commentators argue that the action was justified under tradi-
tional self-defense principles, particularly in light of the expansive
understanding surrounding self-defense that can be invoked in response to
actions by non-state actors acting in a terrorist capacity.94  On the other
hand, other scholars claim that accepting a self-defense justification would
be lowering the threshold of self-defense beyond acceptable limits, and that
the sporadic and low-scale attacks by the Al Shabaab militants did not jus-
tify the extreme act of military intervention into Somalia.95  At this time,
neither the U.N. nor the ICC has undertaken any action to reprimand the
Kenyan government.96  In fact, the Security Council incorporated Kenyan
86. Id.
87. See Ken Menkhaus, Kenya-Somali Conflict Border Analysis, USAID, 9, 11– 12 (Aug.
31, 2005), http://www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Kenya-Somalia%20Menkhaus%20(2)
.pdf.
88. See Birkett, supra note 3. R
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id.; Gettleman, supra note 85. R
93. See Branch, supra note 2. R
94. See Birkett, supra note 3, at 445; Deeks, supra note 8, at 17. R
95. See Cristian Claudiu Teodorescu, Terrorist Organization Al-Shabaab Prospering
From the Chaos in the Failed State of Somalia, 2012 International Conference on Econom-
ics Marketing and Management, 28 IPEDR 215, 219 (2012), http://www.ipedr.com/
vol28/41-ICEMM2012-G00014.pdf.
96. Cf. S.C. Res. 2036, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2036 (Feb. 22, 2012).
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troops into the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in Somalia.97  This
came amidst large-scale support from the regional organization of Kenya’s
interventionist action.98  In addition, the United States also lent its support
to the Kenyan mission in Somalia by deploying a drone strike in September
2014, targeting Al Shabaab insurgents.99  The legality of this strike has also
not garnered much discussion in the international community.
Considering the polarized landscape of opinion regarding the legality
of the self-defense invocation, it is surprising that international forums
have not thoroughly addressed this issue.  One possible factor that perhaps
has quelled opposing views on the legality of Kenya’s action is the knowl-
edge that Kenya received consent to intervene in Somalia from the TFG.100
Consent to intervention has traditionally been recognized as enough justifi-
cation for one state to intervene in the affairs of another, operating some-
what like an international bilateral agreement that binds both parties.101
Consent under these circumstances, however, should have raised different
questions rather than foreclosed questions into the legality of Kenya’s
actions.  The TFG’s questionable status as the “actual” governing body over
Somalia and its people should have raised questions about the standards
required for consent to be valid under international law.  Part III raises
some of these questions, and Part IV seeks to provide a comprehensive and
structured response to those questions.
B. Syrian Crisis and U.S. Involvement
The current crisis in Syria originated in early 2011 with peaceful pro-
tests that petitioned the government to release detained political prison-
ers.102  National security forces in Syria responded to these peaceful
protests with brutal violence.103  The peaceful protests continued, as did
the violence, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad refused to capitulate to
the protesters’ demands or halt any of the attacks being carried out by his
national security forces.104  This violence continued throughout much of
the summer of 2011, all the while the Syrian president denied any state
involvement in the violence, blaming militia groups and terrorist organiza-
tions.105  Towards the end of the summer, the crisis escalated with the
97. See id.
98. See Kenya troops to ‘join Somalia’s African Union force,’ BBC NEWS AFR. (Dec. 7,
2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16077642.
99. U.S. troops mount attacks on al-Shabaab in Somalia, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 2,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/02/us-attacks-al-shabaab-in-
somalia.
100. Can Kenya’s invasion of Somalia be justified?, MERCATORNET  (Oct. 26, 2011),
http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/can_kenyas_invasion_of_somalia_be_justi
fied.
101. Deeks, supra note 8, at 10. R
102. The Crisis in Syria, INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria#UN_responses (last
visited Feb. 11, 2016).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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emergence of government opposition groups, which included, inter alia,
the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian National Council.106  Despite ideolog-
ical differences among the opposition factions, they were united by their
opposition to President al-Assad and his regime, and began violent
attempts to overthrow him— including attacks on civilians who were sus-
pected of being supporters of President al-Assad.107
Syria, like several other countries in the Middle East and North Africa,
began to experience extreme unrest stemming from anti-authoritarian pro-
test.108  The wave of protests in the region was dubbed the “Arab Spring”
and various commentators viewed it as the first step in bringing democracy
to the region.109  The response of the international community to the crisis
in Syria was quite deliberate, some may even say hesitant.110  The U.N.
Human Rights Council established a committee on August 22, 2011, to
inquire into the nature of the violence in Syria and the extent of the con-
flict.111  After seven separate reports, the committee concluded that the
Syrian government and the Shabiha (a heavily armed state-sponsored mili-
tia fighting alongside the national security forces) were responsible for war
crimes and crimes against humanity in the region.112
In February 2012, the United Nations sent former Secretary General
Kofi Annan as special envoy to see if a peace resolution could be reached
between the government and the opposition groups.113  The deal failed,
however, and the U.N. declared that the crisis in Syria had become a de
facto civil war.114  In April, the Security Council “authorized the deploy-
ment of a U.N. Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) of 300 unarmed
observers to facilitate the peace plan in April 2012 . . . .”115  In June, how-
ever, activities were suspended when “the observers’ presence failed to
quell the violence and the mission’s mandate came to an end on 19 August
2012.”116
Polarization within the United Nations led Kofi Annan to resign from
his post as special envoy and continued to handcuff operations by the
Security Council as Russia and China exercised their veto power to prevent
proposed resolutions to alleviate the crisis.117  Without a robust interna-
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. The Arab Spring country by country, THE NAT’L WORLD (June 17, 2011), http://
www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/the-arab-spring-country-by-country.
109. See Carol J. Williams, Where the Arab Spring revolutions went wrong, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 9. 2015), http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-arab-spring-recap-hml-
20151009-htmlstory.html.
110. The Crisis in Syria, supra note 102.
111. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
U.N. HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/Indepen
dentInternationalCommission.aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
112. See id.; The Crisis in Syria, supra note 102.
113. The Crisis in Syria, supra note 102.
114. See Syria in civil war, says UN official Herve Ladsous, BBC NEWS WORLD (June 12,
2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18417952.
115. The Crisis in Syria, supra note 102.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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tional response, the conflict turned into a stalemate.118  On February 22,
2014, the Security Council broke its deadlock and unanimously passed
Resolution 2139, which provided that Syria should have access to humani-
tarian aid.119  The Resolution urged that all parties involved lift sieges, and
that bombing and terrorist acts by al-Qaeda-linked organizations cease.120
The resolution, however, did not authorize the use of sanctions, probably
because Russian and Chinese ties to the region would have led to the exer-
cise of their veto.121
The involvement of ISIS in Syria is a relatively new development in the
crisis.122  Prior to 2011, ISIS was primarily involved in Iraqi affairs.123
ISIS later expanded its presence to eastern Syria, where there was large
support from several groups opposed to the al-Assad regime, and continues
today to increase its prominence in that region.124  In fact, some of the
groups that emerged in 2011 in opposition of al-Assad’s regime have
passed domicile to ISIS to continue the efforts of an overthrow.125  The
United States has been continually involved in the region through the
launch of drone and airstrike attacks against ISIS.126  Prominent scholars
question the legality of these drone strikes, and some even argue that there
may be no legal justification for the United States to attack ISIS.127
As noted in the Introduction, this Note seeks to pose a hypothetical on
the Syrian crisis to raise questions surrounding the consent doctrine.  Sup-
pose that the current Syrian regime— which is hanging onto power in the
region by a thread— were to have given consent to the United States to util-
ize drone strikes against ISIS.  Would this be an incontrovertible justifica-
tion of the legality of the airstrikes?  This hypothetical differs from the
intervention by Kenya into Somalia because the government in question
was undoubtedly in control of Syria, and arguably is still recognizable as
the ruling regime.  That said, interesting questions remain about its capac-
ity to lend cognizable consent under international law to such
intervention.
118. See Max J. Rosenthal, The Neverending Spring: How Syria’s Revolution Became A
Stalemate, THE WORLD POST (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/
21/syrian-civil-war-arab-spring_n_4550626.html.
119. S.C. Res. 2139, ¶¶ 7, 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2139 (Feb. 22, 2014).
120. Id. ¶ 14.
121. The Crisis in Syria, supra note 102.
122. Hussain Abdul-Hussain & Lee Smith, On the Origins of ISIS: why a terrorist state
blossomed in Syria and Iraq?, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.weekly
standard.com/on-the-origin-of-isis/article/804002.
123. Id.
124. Liam Stack, How ISIS expanded its threat, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/14/world/middleeast/isis-expansion.html.
125. See Rosenthal, supra note 118. R
126. U.S. hits ISIS with airstrikes in Syria, CBS NEWS (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www
.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-launches-first-airstrikes-against-isis-in-syria/.
127. Michael C. Dorf, What Is the International Law Justification for Targeting IS/ISIS/
ISIL in Syria?, DORF ON LAW (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2014/09/
what-is-international-law-justification.html.
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III. Consent, Unfettered
Significantly, most scholars and international tribunals view consent
as the foundation of international law itself.128  Multilateral treaties and
conventions, which essentially govern international law on a larger scale,
are the product of countries consenting to certain terms that govern their
behavior in relation to international action.129  For treaty formulation and
conventions, the process of creating the documents and ensuring accession
to every term is quite robust.130  Even the eligibility requirements for who
can represent a specific sovereign in treaty negotiations is quite stringent in
order to ensure the resulting document’s legitimacy and binding effect.131
With regard to bilateral treaty agreements, the level of formality can
vary depending on the nature and subject matter of the agreement.  The
process is usually straightforward when it comes to two nations either cre-
ating or amending a bilateral agreement between themselves.132  For
instance, the United States has a rigorous process for entering into treaty
agreements, particularly those that would have a great impact on its sover-
eignty or national security.133  Typically, treaty ratification requires not
only Presidential assent, but also congressional approval.134  Outside the
realm of treaties, and increasingly common, are executive agreements
entered into by the President without Congressional approval.135  These
agreements tend to be limited to matters that do not seriously affect
national sovereignty.136  Importantly, these agreements often become
applicable law domestically, even though there was no congressional
approval.137  It is quite evident from the existence of such executive agree-
ments that consent can have a huge impact on a country’s obligations.
In some situations, however, the uninhibited power of consent is
curbed.  For example, the process of amending a bilateral agreement
between two parties of a larger multilateral treaty can be rather tricky.  Two
parties to a multilateral agreement can only alter their responsibilities to
each other when doing so would not affect the rights of other parties to the
128. See Deeks, supra note 8, at 9. R
129. Id.
130. See Todd Sandler, Treaties: Strategic Considerations, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 155, 164
(2007) (discussing the transactional costs of treaty formulation); U.S. Treaties & Agree-
ments— The Process, INT’L LEGAL RES. TUTORIAL, https://law.duke.edu/ilrt/treaties_3.htm
(last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
131. See, e.g., John Love, Note, On the Record: Why the Senate Should Have Access To
Treaty Negotiating Documents, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 483, 486– 90 (2013).
132. See Deeks, supra note 8, at 9. R
133. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
134. Id.
135. See The Constitution— Executive Agreements, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NEW AM.
NATION, http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/The-Constitution-Executive-
agreements.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
136. See Damian Paletta, Treaties vs. Executive Agreements: When Does Congress Get a
Vote?, WALL ST. J.: BLOG (Mar. 10, 2015, 8:28 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/
2015/03/10/treaties-vs-executive-agreements-when-does-congress-get-a-vote/.
137. This point is significant because the U.S. Constitution specifically identifies the
role of Congress in enacting law, particularly through the Bicameral Requirement. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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agreement.138  If the rights of other parties are affected, when those parties
were neither aware of the new agreement nor consented to it, their individ-
ual sovereignty will be contravened contrary to international law.
A. Problems Surrounding Consent with Respect to a Failed State
Generally, a failed state is one considered to have a government that
cannot provide “the most fundamental services that make up the state’s
obligations in its contract with society.”139  While several scholars disagree
on how to prevent state failure, many agree that state failure is often caused
by severe economic depression, civil war, extreme governmental corrup-
tion, or a combination of those and other factors.140  The governments, if
they exist, are unable to “project power within their own borders.”141  Of
course, the manifestation of failed states varies depending on the particu-
lar country’s circumstances.  But paradigmatically, the government of a
failed state is unable to provide physical security, basic healthcare, educa-
tion, transportation, communication, and monetary infrastructure.142
Customarily, state failure was only considered a humanitarian prob-
lem.143  The populations of failed states are often at incredible personal
risk due to the lack of physical security, food security, and poverty that
results from their government’s shortcomings.144  Contemporaneously, the
problem of state failure is also viewed as one that exacerbates the age of
terrorism.145  The governments of failed states are powerless to prevent ter-
rorists from operating within their borders.146  Additionally, terrorist
groups often thrive in failed states because they can easily access the mone-
tary resources required to operate by engaging in criminal activity such as
diamond smuggling or drug trafficking.147  And if that were not enough,
terrorist groups find it easy to recruit persons who are desperate to escape
poverty.148  Finally, failed states offer terrorist groups the cover of sover-
eignty: they can take refuge within the borders of a failed state— which is at
least in principle a sovereign nation— and avoid capture because targeted
nations will be hesitant to invade the borders of a sovereign.149
Somalia is a paradigmatic example of a failed state.150  The TFG of
Somalia exerts little authority over much of the nation’s territory.151  The
3200 miles of coastline remain largely un-policed, which allows criminal
138. See Sandler, supra note 130, at 160– 61. R
139. Ben N. Dunlap, Note, State Failure and the Use of Force in the Age of Global Terror,
27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 453, 458 (2004).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 459.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 460.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 459.
151. Id.
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activity such as piracy and kidnapping to run rampant in neighboring
countries such as Kenya.152  The TFG lost most of its authority, if it had
any to begin with, to Islamic insurgents.153  The most prominent group
known to exercise vast control within Somali borders is the Al Shabaab
group, which declared allegiance to al-Qaeda and announced a formal
merger with the well-known terrorist group in 2010.154  In fact, the numer-
ous problems associated with this reality played a large role in driving
Kenya to intervene militarily in Somalia.
While the efficacy of the self-defense rationale raises some interesting
questions under international law, scholars have barely considered the
questions surrounding consent by the TFG.  Security Council Resolution
2036 de facto forecloses the argument that the ICC will declare Kenya’s
invasion into Somalia an invalid exercise of self-defense under interna-
tional law.155  Even if the ICC did make such a declaration, could Kenya’s
intervention legally and validly rely on the consent given by the TFG as
justifying the extreme act of using force within the borders of Somalia?
In order to comprehend fully just how monumental reliance on con-
sent from the TFG as a justification for military intervention would be, we
must begin with the Montevideo Convention,156 which is the international
treaty that defines the basic rights and duties of states under international
law.  The Montevideo Convention identifies four qualities necessary for a
state to qualify as a “person of international law”:
a) A defined territory;
b) A permanent population;
c) Government;
d) The capacity to enter into relations with others.157
While the state’s existence is independent of its recognition by other
countries, Article 2 of the Montevideo Convention proclaims that the “fed-
eral state shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law.”158
Given that the Montevideo Convention does not elaborate on what exactly
gives a nation “capacity to enter into relations” with other countries, nor
does it specify that a government of a particular country needs to be func-
tional or in control of its territory, the questions surrounding consent with
respect to military intervention cannot be resolved by the Convention
alone.
In fact, this vagueness largely creates the problem of unfettered con-
sent.  While it is not the place of international institutions to delve into the
152. See id.
153. Somalia Profile— Timeline, BBC NEWS AFR. (Oct. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Somalia
Profile], http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094503.
154. Id.
155. See S.C. Res. 2036, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2036 (Feb. 22, 2012) (incorporating
Kenyan troops into the African Union Mission in Somalia).
156. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165
L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
157. Id. at art 1.
158. Id. at art 2.
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political processes of different nations, it is noteworthy that the Transi-
tional Federal Parliament (TFP), and not the people of Somalia, elected the
President of Somalia’s TFG.159  Additionally, the formation of the TFP and
the election of the president took place entirely in Kenya.160  Democracy, of
course, is not the benchmark of whether a nation’s government has the
capacity to enter into legal relations with other nations.  Otherwise coun-
tries like China would never hit that benchmark.  Without representative
democracy, however, or control over one’s territory, it is difficult to envis-
age the source of the capacity or authority to enter these relations.
Interestingly, the TFG was internationally recognized as representing
Somalia and its interests despite its lack of control over the territory and its
not having been elected through a representative-democratic election.161
With this recognition, theoretically, the TFG was capable of granting Kenya
consent to intervene militarily within the borders of Somalia for the pur-
poses of quelling Al Shabaab and other insurgent militias in the country.
This, however, is quite problematic.
Firstly, the TFG was largely disconnected from the populace within
Somali borders.  The government hardly operated within Somalia’s bor-
ders, and severe internal conflict and corruption made it difficult to deter-
mine whether the TFG’s actions were actually in accordance with the
wishes of the citizenry.162  Ordinarily, a government in control of its terri-
tory that enforces the rule of law or a government that was elected repre-
sentatively to exercise discretion on behalf of the people is presumed to be
acting in accordance with the wishes of its citizenry.  Imputing that same
presumption to the TFG would be misplaced, particularly because the TFG
could function without much consequence or reprimand from the people,
which is typically the safeguard against overtly obscure government action.
Of course, a state must have some form of representation.  Neverthe-
less, the government standard for a particular territory to qualify as a state
for the purposes of international law ought to be vastly different from the
standard of competence required for a government to consent to military
intervention.  This is particularly true where the government in question is
weak and ineffective.  Many believe that the TFG was heavily influenced by
the Kenyan government because it operated out of Kenya, was elected in
Kenya, and often acted in a manner in tandem with certain objectives the
Kenyan government wanted to achieve.163
159. Somalia Profile, supra note 153.
160. Id.
161. See Adjoa Anyimadu, A Political Solution for Somalia, CHATHAM HOUSE: THE ROYAL
INST. INT’L AFF. (Feb. 6, 2012), https://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/
182049.
162. See Jason Straziuso, UN report cites massive corruption in Somali gov’t, THE
WORLD POST (July 16, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20120716/af-
somalia-un-report/.
163. See Bronwyn Bruton & Paul D. Williams, Cut-Rate Counterterrorism: Why
America can no longer afford to outsource the war on al-Shabab, FP (Oct. 8, 2013), http://
foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/08/cut-rate-counterterrorism/.
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On its face, the legitimacy of any such consent is dubious, and several
questions surrounding the capacity to consent ought to be asked.  Other-
wise, through recognition alone, a government that is neither in control of
its territory nor democratically elected by a representative part of its popu-
lation can forever change the fate of its people.  This revelation is too signif-
icant to presume valid consent.  Moreover, it is too significant to ignore the
need to formulate a structured methodology for determining if consent is
valid— looking at whether consent was informed and whether the govern-
ment giving that consent had the capacity to do so.
B. Civil War and Consent
The problems surrounding consent in relation to a nation embroiled
in a civil war are different, although not mutually exclusive, from those
considered above in relation to a failed state.  The major difference is that
legitimacy is only questionable because the government is losing control
over the territory.  The plain existence of a civil war suggests that a large
portion of the population opposes the government’s activities or policies.
In contrast to the wholly ineffective government of a failed state, the gov-
ernment of a nation embroiled in a civil war was, at least at one point, the
legitimate “face and mouthpiece” of the country.
Again, as mentioned above, democratic elections are not a fundamen-
tal prerequisite for a government’s actions to be recognized as an exercise
of legitimate authority over its people.  Syria has largely been under author-
itarian rule, and when the Ba’ath regime took over in 1963, there was no
question that President Hafez al-Assad’s actions represented the position of
Syria in matters of international law.164
After the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000, Bashar al-Assad— one of
Hafez al-Assad’s younger sons— succeeded his father in an uncontested ref-
erendum by the People’s Council of Syria.165  In 2007, Bashar al-Assad was
re-confirmed as the president of Syria in the same manner.166  While there
may have been discontent among part of the citizenry, such discontent was
indistinguishable from that of Americans who consider themselves Repub-
lican and vehemently disagree with the actions of an executive that is Dem-
ocrat.  As a matter of legitimacy in international law, no doubts were cast
over al-Assad’s authority to act on behalf of Syria.
Since the uprising in Syria turned violent and the nation descended
into civil war, numerous efforts to stabilize the nation have failed.167
Nonetheless, in 2014, the country held its first election since the start of
the civil war; President al-Assad won in a landslide victory, securing 88.7%
164. See Syria Profile— Overview, BBC NEWS MIDDLE E. (Oct. 7, 2014) [hereinafter
Syria Profile], http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703910.
165. See Syrians Vote For Assad in Uncontested Referendum, WASH. POST (May 28,
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/27/AR2007
052701117.html.
166. Id.
167. Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC NEWS MIDDLE E. (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www
.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868.
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of the vote.168  Unlike al-Assad’s two prior elections, this election featured
two opponents in the election, but many suspect that these candidates were
nothing more than window dressing to give the impression that democracy
was at work.169  In fact, scholars and commentators alike believe that the
election was fraught with numerous irregularities and was rigged to keep
Bashar al-Assad in power.170  The Syrian government, however, has denied
any criticism of the process.171
Objectively, how representative can an election held during a period of
civil war be?  Should international observers accept that half the nation
laid down their arms for one day in order to partake in a “democratic”
electoral process, when in fact, the uprising which caused the civil war was
premised on bringing about democracy in Syria?  Regardless of the specu-
lated rigging of the recent Syrian election, serious doubts still exist as to its
representativeness.  ISIS continues to expand control over Syria and gain
support from the public to establish an Islamic state, which further casts
doubt on the legitimacy of the Syrian government, which claims to be
secular.172
Given all the suspicion and uncertainty as to whether the current gov-
ernment is actually representing the will of the Syrian people, how can
consent to intervention from this government be legitimate?  For instance,
if one were to hypothesize a situation where the Syrian government con-
sented to U.S. drone strikes, can that consent serve as a definitive defense
to any accusation of an unlawful intervention in Syrian affairs?
Given that not many questions are asked about consent and there
seems to be an operating presumption that a government recognized by
other nations has the capacity and legitimacy to consent to intervention, it
is apparent that consent is a dangerous tool.  While these dangers are simi-
lar between failed states and states embroiled in a civil war, the structural
solutions on determining if consent should be valid are quite different.
This Note will explore these solutions in Part IV, drawing on principles of
private law to create a nuanced doctrine on how consent needs to be
controlled.
IV. A Structured Approach to Consent
To reiterate, consent in international law is vast and uninhibited.173
When it comes to consenting to use of force in one’s territory, interna-
tional bodies should implement measures to curb the excess emphasis put
on consent.  Considering that the responsibility to protect and self-defense
168. Mohammed Tawfeeq & Jethro Mullen, Syrian President al-Assad re-elected easily,
state  media reports, CNN (June 4, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/04/world/
meast/syria-unrest/.
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. See Abdul-Hussain & Smith, supra note 122; Syria Profile, supra note 164.
173. Deeks, supra note 8, at 8. R
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doctrines as drafted are quite limited in their scope,174 countries have the
ability to invoke consent in several international crises with virtually no
control.  The act of consenting is not a principle that operates solely in the
international law context.  In fact, private law has developed very sophisti-
cated doctrines of consent in different fields that can provide some insight
as to how consent should be structured with respect to use of force and
state intervention.  The two private law concepts that are particularly illus-
trative are: (1) informed consent, as it operates in medical law; and (2)
competence, as it operates in criminal procedure.
A. Informed Consent
It is a basic principle of medicine that no doctor, no matter how bril-
liant, can impose treatment on an individual without that person’s consent,
assuming that person is able to provide consent.175  This doctrine is based
primarily on an individual’s right to self-determination and autonomy.176
Informed consent, at least generally, creates an expectation in patients that
their doctors, prior to recommending one course of treatment, will explain
(1) what that treatment is, (2) the risks of undergoing that course of treat-
ment, and (3) any available alternatives and their risks.177  Presumably,
once provided with this information, a patient will be provided with all the
necessary tools to be able to make a reasoned decision about what should
happen to his or her body.178
Informed consent in the medical context provides a useful parallel to
one aspect that should be used to curb consent as it operates in interna-
tional law.  Just as patients receive an objective set of terms detailing their
treatment prior to those patients providing consent, so too should govern-
ments receive an objective set of terms prior to consenting to military inter-
vention or use of force within another country’s borders.  These terms
ought to be sufficiently detailed such that a consenting country can be
fully aware of the actions that the intervening country intends to undertake
within its borders, rather than just a vague accession to intervening action.
Additionally, the risks and potential consequences must accompany these
terms in order for the consent to be “informed.”
The difficulty, however, comes with enforcing such a requirement.  An
agreement between two nations is simply a bilateral agreement, and those
countries have no obligation to explain the terms of their agreement to the
international community.179  Nor can the international community inter-
fere with the sovereignty of those countries by trying to exert themselves
174. See Background Information on the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 14; U.N.
Charter art. 51.
175. See Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care
Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 267 (1999).
176. See id.
177. Id. at 267– 68.
178. See id. Because there are questions surrounding capacity and voluntariness in
the medical context, for the purposes of this Note, criminal procedure law on capacity
and voluntariness provides a more apt structure.
179. See Deeks, supra note 8, at 9. R
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over those affairs.180  Regardless, with respect to use of force and military
intervention, the United Nations should impose special rules that require
countries that have agreed to intervention to report these agreements.  The
basis for this requirement can be largely justified by the impact on neigh-
boring countries and other humanitarian issues that accompany such
action,181 which make it a concern for the international community at
large.
The current operation of consent would need to be altered to adjust
the role of the ultra vires doctrine.182  While it may result in unfair out-
comes to allow a nation to go back on its obligations based on an ex-post
reliance on the ultra vires doctrine, if reporting an agreement of interven-
tion is required before involvement, ex-ante discoveries of actions contrary
to a nation’s domestic law can be made and avoided.  The supremacy of
international law makes this point critical.183  States are required to meet
their international obligations regardless of any contradicting domestic
provisions.184
Allowing a consent system in the use of force that creates an obligation
that trumps domestic law is not only irresponsible, but can have cata-
strophic political consequences.  International law should aim to limit
instances in which domestic law and international law conflict.  Bilateral
agreements of this kind may in fact not even be necessary given that states
have the option of seeking assistance from the international community at
large.  Trying to limit such agreements would interfere too heavily with
state sovereignty, however, so implementing some controlling requirements
would help ensure that such agreements facilitating military intervention
do not run rampant.
With respect to the case examples and hypotheticals proffered here,
these changes to the operation of consent would require that the Somali
TFG have known the detailed parameters of Kenya’s proposed use of force
within their borders.  This was, in actuality, likely the case— at least to a
certain extent.  Thus, with respect to the Somali invasion case example, the
more relevant factor to consider is competence: was the TFG competent to
consent to Kenya’s intervention?185
180. See id.
181. See, e.g., Daniel Wagner & Giorgio Cafiero, Regional Implications of a South Suda-
nese Civil War, WORLD POST (Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wag-
ner/regional- implications-of-_b_4556718.html.
182. A country that consents to an international agreement cannot claim that they
cannot complete their terms of agreement on the grounds that the action they agreed to
is inconsistent with their country’s own laws.  Consent in this context trumps illegality.
See Deeks, supra note 8, at 10. R
183. See id. at 6– 8.
184. ANDRE NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 286
(2011) (observing that the supremacy principle requires international law to prevail
over domestic law, whatever the contents of international law and whatever the nature of
the decision-making process through which states have entered into those international
commitments).
185. This Note will address this point in Part IV.B.
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The Syria hypothetical, on the other hand, presents some interesting
informed consent concerns.  In order for consent to be deemed valid under
international law, the United States would be required to prove that it had
received specific consent to launch drone strikes.  The parameters of con-
sent would need to include an explanation of the risks and possible conse-
quences, including likely civilian casualties.  Such a requirement is the
only way to establish definitively that Syria (in the hypothetical) knew
what it was agreeing to, and that the agreement formed was representative
of the actions taken.  Only then would consent be deemed to have provided
an adequate legal basis for intervention under international law.
B. Competence
In criminal procedure, different standards of competence apply in dif-
ferent situations.186  For instance, the competence level of a defendant
required to stand trial is different from that required for a defendant to be
executed, or for a defendant to represent himself in a criminal proceed-
ing.187  The varying standard clearly shows that different parts of the pro-
cess require different levels of competence because at those different
stages, different tasks and expectations are required of that defendant.
Notably, however, the lowest threshold of competence in criminal proce-
dure is that required to stand trial, which is set out in Dusky v. United
States.188  In order to be competent to carry out other acts in the criminal
process such as pleading guilty or representing oneself, a defendant must
first prove that he satisfies this lower level threshold.189
Competence with respect to criminal procedure in the United States
therefore serves as a useful analogy on which to draw competence require-
ments with respect to consenting to military intervention.  Therefore, the
first question should be whether the government of a failed state has the
competence to consent to military intervention.  This is an altogether dif-
ferent question from whether the government has the capacity to enter
legal relations as required by the Montevideo Convention.190  The differ-
ence lies in the difference between “capacity” and “competence.”  Compe-
tence, in this context, suggests efficacy and legitimacy, whereas capacity
simply connotes ability to act.
186. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(2d ed. 2013).
187. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 174– 78 (2008) (pointing out that in some
situations a defendant may satisfy the Dusky standard of competence to stand trial but
fail in showing the court that the defendant has the competence to represent himself);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (declaring juveniles ineligible to be sen-
tenced to death); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (setting
out two conditions for whether a defendant is competent to stand trial: (1) Whether the
defendant has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him, and (2) Whether the defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding”).
188. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
189. See, e.g., Edwards, 554 U.S. at 174– 78 (finding a defendant competent to stand
trial but not competent to represent himself).
190. Montevideo Convention, supra note 156, at art. 1.
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Unfortunately, the Dusky standard is not of much help in analogizing
what considerations should be assessed in determining competence with
respect to legitimacy and representativeness of government action.  In this
Note’s view, some relevant factors include the functionality of the govern-
ment of the failed state, the process in which it came to power, and the
control it exercises over its territory.  This list is by no means exhaustive,
but offers a good starting point in determining if the government of a failed
state can adequately consent to intervention.  Based on these preliminary
considerations, consent by the TFG seems to be legally inadequate.  This
means that Kenya cannot invoke the consent of the TFG to justify any sort
of military intervention in Somalia.  Of course, international drafters
should provide a more nuanced and intricate measuring mechanism in
order to make this determination.  This mechanism must be based on
objective factors that do not require interference with the internal affairs or
political processes of different nations.
Determining Syria’s competence to consent to intervention will likely
be a more difficult task because analysis of the factors both support and
reject a finding of competence.  The situation is analogous to Indiana v.
Edwards in that regard, in which a standard higher than Dusky competence
was required for self-representation, but not exactly defined.191  Making
this determination would be much simpler within a defined measuring
rubric.  The responsibility to make this determination should fall to an
international body like the United Nations after the reporting requirement
has been satisfied.  With respect to the hypothetical posed, Syrian consent
to drone strikes may in fact be considered valid under international law
given the circumstances, and the level of intervention sought (in contrast
with full-scale military intervention in the Kenya-Somalia case).
Without asking the question of competence to consent to the use of
force, and instead presuming its existence, the international legal commu-
nity is shrugging its responsibility in ensuring that any use of force is a last
resort, and that such action accords with the Charters, Conventions, and
Treaty Agreements that have been developed over decades.
Conclusion
This Note offers a foundational basis on how consent ought to be
structured in order to control its vast power under international law.  As it
stands, questions of competence and informed consent are not sufficiently
raised.  Instead, consent and the agreements formed therefrom are pre-
sumed to be valid under international law.192  The consent question is so
important because of its vast application, which is necessitated by the fact
that the self-defense provisions and the responsibility to protect doctrine
are so limited in their scope.
A nuanced and structured approach to consent offers the best route of
“plugging a leak” that current international law doctrines have refused to
191. See generally Edwards, 554 U.S at 174– 78.
192. See generally Deeks, supra note 8. R
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address.  Arguably, the international community attempted to plug this
leak by creating a robust responsibility to protect doctrine.  That original
document, however, crumbled under the weight of several countries refus-
ing to recognize their affirmative obligation to intervene in humanitarian
crises.  Additionally, the scope of the responsibility to protect doctrine was
limited in scope to crises of the most severe proportions, therefore ruling
out several international crises in the new age.193  Making the necessary
changes to the consent doctrine in the realm of use of force may provide
much needed structure to an otherwise vast and uncontrolled sector of
international law.
Notably, however, the structure that is adopted to govern consent
must not inhibit a country’s exercise of its core sovereign power, nor can
two nations be limited in seeking to engage in the formation of lawful bilat-
eral agreements.  The purpose of creating such a mechanism is to control
intervention on the basis of consent, particularly implied consent, which is
very difficult to prove and articulate, and involve the international commu-
nity directly in use of force matters.  The principles of informed consent, as
laid out in the medical field, and competence, as laid out in criminal proce-
dure, offer a starting point and useful analogous doctrinal theories on
which to base a structured consent doctrine in international law.
193. See Weiss, supra note 54. R
